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THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION AND SPECIAL,
PRIVATE, AND LOCAL LEGISLATION
IN NORTH CAROLINA
FRANK P. SPRUILL, JR.*

Prior to 1917 the North Carolina' Constitution prohibited special,
private, and local legislation granting divorces in individual cases,'
altering the names of persons not born in lawful wedlock, and restoring the rights of citizenship to persons convicted of an infamous
crime;2 with the further provision that no private law should be
passed unless it be made to appear that thirty days' notice of application to pass such law had been given. 3 In 1917 there was added
the present section 29 of Article II, consisting of a prohibition of
local, private, or special laws in fourteen enumerated cases, with a
supplementary mandate that the General Assembly should not enact
such laws by the partial repeal of a general law. The result of the
1917 Amendment has been a decrease in the number of special and
private laws in the face of a corresponding increase in the number of
general laws. Thus, in 1915 there were passed 287 Public laws, 814
Public-Local laws, and 395 Private laws. In 1931 these proportions
had changed to 455 Public laws, 497 Public-Local laws, and 191
Private laws.
That the 1917 Amendment has not more completely cut down
the amount of special legislation may be due to several factors. The
list of topics may be incomplete. For example, there is no ban on
local laws relating to fish and game, a prolific source of this type of
legislation. Because of a lack of any systematic check on the validity of proposed or actually enacted local laws, and because the Supreme Court of the State has had to pass on only a small number of
the clauses in Article II, section 29, a considerable number of unconstitutional statutes may now be on the books. Nevertheless, a brief
glance at the judicial construction of these clauses may serve as a
basis for evaluating the changes proposed by the Constitutional
Commission.
* Student Research Assistant. This paper was prepared in the course in
Legislation conducted by Dean M. T. Van Hecke.
'IN. C. Const., Art. II, §10.
2 N. C. Const., Art. II, §11.

3 N. C. Const., Art. II, §12.
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Authorizing the laying out of highways. This clause has been
construed strictly, and an act will not fall under its prohibition unless it directly authorizes the laying out of a particular road or highway. 4 An act which authorizes a county to issue bonds for the
purpose of grading and constructing public roads is constitutional
because the main purpose of the act, the "direct legislation," is the
bond issue, and the fact that the bonds are to be issued for road purposes is incidental. 5 Nor is the clause offended by an act which
creates or incorporates a board of road commissioners in a designated county with power to issue bonds and construct roads, for
such an act contains no provision for the laying out of any given
road or highway; it merely sets up governmental machinery for that
purpose.6 As to this clause no specific constitutional change is
proposed.
Relating to ferries and bridges. Because of the scope of the term
"relating to," it would seem that the efficacy of this prohibition would
have been assured. But the clause has received the same strict construction as has the highway clause, and does not prohibit an act'which
creates in one county a commission for the building of bridges,T or an
act which authorizes a single county to issue bonds for the purpose of
building bridges over a designated river in conjunction with an adjoining county. 8 The act, to be condemned as special legislation
under the Constitution, must direct in detail the construction of a
particular bridge at a specified spot." No constitutional change is
proposed here.
IIt is significant that no case has been found inwhich the court condemned
an act involving the construction of roads.
r Brown v. Road Commissioners of North Cove Township, 173 N. C. 598,

92 S. E. 502 (1917); Commissioners of Wilkes County v. Pruden, 178 N. C.
394, 100 S. E. 695 (1919). In the Brown case, which was apparently the first
adjudication of this question by the Court, Justice Allen dissented with the contention that the act was in violation of the constitutional prohibition.
6 Commissioners of Surry County v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 178 N. C.
170, 100 S. E. 421 (1919) ; Huneycutt v. Commissioners of Stanly County, 182
N. C. 319, 109 S. E. 4 (1921) ; Road Commissioners of Ashe County v. Bank

of Ashe, 181 N. C.347, 107 S.E.245 (1921).

' Huneycutt v. Commissioners of Stanly County, supra note 6.
8 Mills v. Commissioners of Iredell County, 175 N. C. 215, 95 S. E. 481
(1918).
' Day v.Commissioners of Yadkin and Surry Counties, 191 N. C.780, 133

S.E. 164 (1926). This was the "direct legislation" referred to by the Court
in the Mills case, supra note 8: "Our General Assembly was constantly called
on by direct legislation to authorize a particular highway or street, or to establish a bridge or ferry at some specified place. The Legislature was called on
to usurp functions more usually and properly performed by local authorities,
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Establishing or changing the lines of school districts. Where the
manifest purpose of the act is to establish or change the lines of a
particular school district, the constitutional prohibition is obviously

applicable, and the fact that the act contains a provision for a bond
issue does not purge it of its objectionable character.10 However,
the clause does not prevent the legislature from enacting a law which
enlarges particular city limits for the purpose of including a school

district, 1 or which creates a special taxing district for school purposes.12 Under the proposed Constitution there is created a new
State Board of Education in which is vested the general supervision
of the public school system, including the power to divide the State
into a convenient number of school districts without regard to township or county lines. 13 This provision strikes at the root of the evil

by substituting administrative regulation for special legislation on
this topic.
Relating to the establishment of courts inferior to the Superior
Courts. The weakness of this clause lies in the fact that, due to the
limits of the term "establishment," it does not prohibit special legislation abolishing' 4 or increasing the jurisdiction of "i a court already
and it was in reference to local and special and private measures of this character that the amendments were adopted."
20Trustees of School District v. Mutual Loan & Trust Co., 181 N. C. 306,
107 S. E. 130 (1921) ; Sechrist v. Commissioners of Guilford County, 181 N. C.
511, 107 S. E. 503 (1921) ; Robinson v. Commissioners of Brunswick County,
182 N. C. 590, 109 S. E. 855 (1921). It should be noted that the prohibition
against "establishing or changing the lines of school districts" does not prevent
the enactment of a special or local law which incorporates an existing school
district and does not establish or change the lines thereof. Such a law is valid
under Art. VII, §14 of the Constitution which, by judicial construction, allows
the enactment of special laws in regard to municipal corporations. Dickson v.
Brewer, 180 N. C. 403, 104 S. E. 887 (1920). To the effect that the act need
not be general, Tyrrell County v. Holloway, 182 N. C. 64, 108 S. E. 337 (1921).
n Duffy v. Greensboro, 186 N. C. 470, 120 S. E. 53 (1923) ; Hailey v. Winston-Salem, 196 N. C. 17, 144 S. E. 377 (1928). In the language of the Court
the acts "only recognized and retained the district as it then existed and had
existed for a number of years."
2 Coble v. Commissioners of Guilford County, 184 N. C. 342, 114 S. E. 487
(1922). "Since the general power of the Legislature to create a taxing district
and fix its boundaries is neither denied nor impaired by the constitutional amendment Art. II, §29; since the school districts are retained with their former
'boundaries; and since the powers of the school committee in each district are
unchanged and the organization of the school is not affected," the act is not
in conflict with the Constitution.
22 Proposed Const. for N. C., Art. VII, §6, Report of the Constitutional
Commission, 11 N. C. L. REv. 5, at 33.
', Queen v. Commissioners of Haywood County, 193 N. C. 821, 138 S. E.
310 (1927).
' State v. Home, 191 N. C. 375, 131 S. E. 753 (1926).
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in existence. The proposed Constitution remedies this defect by
stipulating in the new Article on the Judiciary that "the General Assembly shall provide by general laws for the creation and jurisdiction
of courts inferior to the Superior Courts; but shall pass no special
or local law with relation to (author's italics) such courts."' 16
But even this provision fails to affect the ruling of our Court that a
law which establishes these courts only in some of the counties in the
State can in no sense be regarded as a local or special law within the
7
ordinary meaning of these terms.'
Relating to health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances.
This clause prohibits a law which authorizes an election for the
purpose of voting bonds for the erection of a tuberculosis hospital
in one county,' 8 or a law which creates a sanitary district in a spedfied locality. 19 But it does not prohibit a law which creates a system
of sanitary districts in one county. 20 For this the Court ascribes
two reasons: (1) it applies generally to the entire county and is thus
not special or local, and (2) when taken as a whole it does not relate
to health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances, the only purpose being "to provide districts wherein sanitary measures may be
provided in rural districts." The proposed Constitution would
change this prohibition to read "health, sanitation, or the abatement
of nuisances.12 1 The reason for the change from "and" to "or" is
6 Proposed Const. for N. C., Art. IV, §9, 11 N. C. L. REv., supra note 13,
at 27.
1'1n re Harris, 183 N. C. 633, 112 S. E. 425 (1922) (establishing courts inferior to the Superior Courts in 56 of the State's 100 counties). This is one
of the few cases in which the North Carolina Supreme Court has resorted to
classification as a basis of preserving a law from the condemnation of Art.
II, §29. In most states there is a wholesale employment of this basis as a
means of purging a law of its special or local character. Infra note 30. Cf.
Jones v. Standard Oil Co., 202 N. C. 328, 162 S. E. 741 (1932) (amendment
of previous judicially construed general act establishing courts, so as to be
applicable to Buncombe County).
'Armstrong v. Commissioners of Gaston County, 185 N. C. 405, 117 S. E.

388 (1923).
"Drysdale v. Prudden, 195 N. C. 722, 143 S. E. 530 (1928).
'Reed v. Engineering Co., 188 N. C. 39, 123 S. E. 479 (1924) ; Kenilworth
v. Hyder, 197 N. C. 85, 147 S. E. 736 (1929). The language of the Reed case
is vefy unsatisfactory, and it is not clear whether the Court held that the act
did not relate to sanitation; or that the act did not relate to the clause as a
whole: "health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances"; or that the act
was general in character. It was only in a later case that the Court brought

out the fact that the act involved in the Reed case "applied generally to the
entire County of Buncombe."
I Proposed Const. for N. C., Art. II, §19, 11 N. C. Rnv., supra note 13,
at 19.
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There seems to have been no litigation based on that
4

Acts authorizing bond issues. There is in our present Constitution no separate provision dealing with this topic. However, its extreme importance demands individual attention. Although the
Supreme Court has not pointed it out clearly in cases involving special legislation, many of the decisions noted in the preceding paragraphs have been based upon Article V, section 6 of the Constitution
now in force.22 This fixes a limitation of fifteen cents on the one
hundred dollars for the total of State and local taxation, "except
when the county property tax is levied for a special purpose and
with the special approval of the General Assembly, which may be
done by special or (author's italics) general act. . . ." In the nature
of the case, this clause not only permits, but it requires special legislation for local projects involving new taxation.
Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the constitutional provision just quoted, and most of the decisions in question, are relics
of a day when matters pertaining to roads and bridges and to municipal and county finance generally, were handled as purely local problems. Today we have witnessed the development of a trend toward
centralized State control in these fields. For example, the powers
of the State Highway Commission now extend to the county roads,
and the Local Government Commission now exercises a centralized
administrative control of local finance.
This tendency the proposed new Constitution perpetuates, first,
by the omission of Article V, section 6, and second, by the provision
that the legislature shall by general laws provide appropriate regulations governing municipal and county budgets and tax levies, and
I Where the .bond issue is the "direct legislation" and the construction of
the roads or bridges is incidental, the act will be sustained. Brown v. Road
Commissioners of North Cove Township, supra note 5; Commissioners of
Wilkes County v. Pruden, supra note 5; Mills v. Commissioners of Iredell
County, supra note 8. But where the bond issue is the incidental feature of an
act which seeks to accomplish a matter within the prohibition of Art. II, §29,
the Court will not sustain the act. Trustees of School District v. Mutual Loan
&-Trust Co.; Sechrist v. Commissioners of Guilford County; Robinson v.
Commissioners of Brunswick County, all supra note 10; Armstrong v. Commissioners of Gaston County, supra note 18; Day v. Commissioners of Yadkin
and Surry counties, supra note 9. The bond issue provided for in such an act
is not only incidental to the main purpose of the act, but that purpose itself is
not within the contemplation of Art. V, §6, as is the construction of roads and
bridges. Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. McArtan, 185 N. C. 201, 116 S. E. 731
(1923); see Trustees of School District v. Mutual Loan & Trust Co., supra
note 10 at 308.
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shall create a state agency having general supervision over local governmental finance, whose approval for a bond issue is required unless
23
the people of the locality vote otherwise.
In the above enumerated ways the proposed Constitution attempts
to meet some of the specific weaknesses in the present Constitution.
More effectively to establish a curb upon special legislation, the Constitutional Commission offers three other changes.
Omission of the notice requirementin the passage of private laws.
Due to the refusal of the Court to inquire into the verity of the legislative records, the existing constitutional provision requiring notice
of application to pass private laws2 4 has been unenforceable. 25 The
proposed Constitution does not include it.
Municipal government. Article VII, section 14 of the present
Constitution, as judicially construed, permits the legislature to enact
special legislation for the organization of municipal and county government.2 6 This provision has been displaced in the proposed Constitution by one that: "The General Assembly shall provide by general laws for the organization and government of counties, cities,
towns, and other municipal corporations, but shall pass no special or
local law relating thereto. Optional plans for the organization and
government of counties, cities, and towns may bd provided by law, to
be effective when submitted to the legal voters thereof and approved
by a majority of those voting thereon."2 7 'This change is designed
to relieve the legislature of a heavy burden and is praiseworthy as a
distinctly forward step. However, its success will be entirely dependent on a wise exercise of discretion by the General Assembly.
For example, the legislatures in some states have gfossly abused the
privilege of enacting "local option" laws by so framing an act as
practically to preclude its adoption in municipalities other than the
one for which it was intended.28 Though general in character, and
2' Proposed Const. for N. C., Art. V, §4, 11 N. C. L. REv., supra note 13,

at 29.
, N. C. Const., Art. II, §12.
" Broadnax v. Groom, 64 N. C. 244 (1870) ; Carolina-Tennessee Power Co.
v. Hiawassee River Co., 175 N. C. 668, 96 S. E. 99 (1918).
"Tyrrell County v. Holloway, supra note 10; Smith v. School Trustees,

141 N. C. 143, 53 S. E. 524 (1906).

I Proposed Const. for N. C., Art. II, §18, 11 N. C. L. REv., supra note 13,
at 19.
DoDD, STATE GOVERNxMENT (1922) 66; Special Legislation for Municipalities (1905) 18 HARv. L. Rv. 588, 597. Under this plan a law may be passed
appropriate to the needs of only one community, but the fact that it applies to
all communities that adopt it prevents it from being special or local legislation.
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thus immune from attack on constitutional grounds, such an act obviously is not a practical improvement over clearly special legislation.
The executive veto. In granting this power the proposed Constitution provides an opportunity for a systematic and prompt check
upon the validity of special and local legislation. 29 Under the present Constitution there is passed at each session a large amount of
such legislation which is largely unconstitutional but which for various reasons never reaches the courts. A conscientious exercise of the
veto power, based upon the advice of the Attorney General, can serve
as a means of intercepting many of these laws at their inception by
calling to the attention of a frequently indifferent and constantly
harassed legislature the unconstitutional character of particular
measures.
CONCLUSION

No one seriously denies that in a state with such heterogeneous
conditions as exist between the coastal, Piedmont, and mountain sections of North Carolina, a high degree of flexibility in the responsiveness of the General Assembly to local needs is not only desirable,
but necessary. Certainly it has been the experience of other states
that when the constitutional prohibitions upon special and local legislation have been too severe or restrictive in their nature, the purpose
of the constitution has been largely defeated by evasion through devices such as that of classification of municipal units on the basis of
population, area, or assessed evaluation of property, so as to make
wholly.local the actual operation of the laws.3 0 No state seems to
As a practical matter, only the one community will adopt it. A somewhat
similar method of evasion is the enactment of a mass of general laws on the
same subjecti each law containing a clause that it shall not be construed to
repeal any existing laws on that subject. 18 HARV. L. REV., supra, at 598.
Proposed Const. for N. C., Art. II, §21, 11 N. C. L. REv., supra note 13,
at 20. North Carolina is the only state in the Union whose Governor does
not possess the veto power.
LEwis' SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1904) §§203 et seq; I
DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) §§147 et seq. If. the classification is not manifestly unreasonable and arbitrary, a law which applies to
only one county in the state is general. Ex parte Settle, 114 Va. 715, 77 S. E.
496 (1913) (applying to all counties with population over 300 per square mile,
there being only one county in that class). Besides being subject to evasion
on .the grounds of classification, all of the many types of special law prohibitions found in state constitutions have disclosed certain inherent weaknesses
on which the courts of the respective states have based a refusal to hold particular acts unconstitutional. As was pointed out, North Carolina is an example of this mode of procedure.

THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION

147

have completely solved the problem. 31 It is believed, however, that
the changes proposed by the Constitutional Commission go far to
improve the situation. The proposed Constitution not only stops
certain gaps in the purely restrictive provisions, but it seeks to relieve the General Assembly of a burden seriously disruptive of its
opportunity to consider the more important state-wide measures by
providing more expeditiously for the variant needs of the local communities through the medium of central administrative agencies.
I See DoDD, STATE GOVERNMENT (1928) pp. 83-84, 176-178, 390-397; Anderson, Special Legislation in Minnesota (1923) 7 MINx. L. REv. 133, 187; Van
Hecke, Four Suggested Improvements in the North CarolinaLegislative Process (1930) 9 N. C. L. REv. 1, 9; (1928) 7 N. C. L. REv. 65.

